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Abstract
This article establishes conditions suﬃcient to ensure that a decision of
the ﬁrm is judged to be desirable by any one shareholder (e.g., the ﬁrm’s
manager) if and only if every shareholder judges it to be desirable. One
such condition is that the decision would not alter the set of distributions
of returns available in the whole economy. Another is that shareholders
are interested only in the mean and variance of the returns from their
portfolios. The analysis allows for the possibility of incomplete markets.

1

Introduction

One approach to the problem of selecting decision criteria for a ﬁrm is to identify
those circumstances in which a manager, if delegated the task, would have an
incentive to choose the “preferred” alternatives. Supposing that the manager is
also a shareholder, such a circumstance would be one in which all shareholders
are necessarily in unanimous agreement as to which alternatives are preferable.
Then, acting in his self-interest, the manager would of his own volition make
decisions which would be endorsed unanimously by the other shareholders. This
circumstance is a special case of the general problem of constructing managerial
incentives analysed by Wilson.1
It is well-known2 that the problem is fully solved when there is a “complete”
set of markets for state-contingent claims. In this case it is in the interest of
each shareholder to maximize the value of the ﬁrm. The ﬁrm’s state-contingent
returns are evaluated at the market prices for state-contingent claims, which for
∗ The authors are indebted to Alan Kraus, Hayne Leland, Robert Litzenberger and Niels
C. Nielsen for discussions on this topic.
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each shareholder are equal to his marginal rates of substitution for contingent
income.
The problem has substance, therefore, only when there are incomplete markets for state-contingent claims, as in the formulation of Radner.3 In the case
of incomplete markets, shareholders are unable to insure against every contingency, and therefore their marginal rates of substitution for contingent income
may diﬀer. Consequently, proposed changes in the ﬁrm’s state-distribution of
returns may be met with a divided response among the shareholders.
The main purpose of this note is to demonstrate, nevertheless, that if the
alternative decisions available to the ﬁrm would not alter the set of statedistributions of returns available in the whole economy, then the shareholders
would be unanimous in their preferences. In fact, each shareholder would use
the current market prices for existing securities to evaluate proposed changes
in the ﬁrm’s distribution of returns. This result shows that the eﬀects of inoperative markets are limited to proposals which would change the set of statedistributions of returns available in the whole economy. Proposals which would
not change this set can be evaluated in terms of the prevailing prices for existing
securities. In particular, failure to obtain unanimity on a proposed project is a
signal that separate incorporation of the project as a new ﬁrm would enlarge
the feasible set of state-distribution of returns available to the shareholders.
An interesting example of this result occurs for the model of Diamond4 and
its generalization by Leland5 , which is analyzed in detail in a companion paper
in this volume. In this special case, the technology of the ﬁrm is such that
every proposal would leave unchanged the set of available state-distributions of
returns. Consequently, unanimity is always assured in Diamond’s and Leland’s
models.
A further special case of some interest is a demonstration that unanimity
always obtains when shareholders value only the mean and variance of their
portfolios. In particular, the unanimous preference of the shareholders is not
necessarily such as to maximize the market price of the ﬁrm. This phenomena
has also been demonstrated recently by Stiglitz and analyzed in successive papers by Jensen and Long and Fama.6 Here we show that it can also be explained
by an arbitrage process, following an earlier line of argument by Wilson.7 In
a companion paper in this volume, Merton and Subrahmanyam8 demonstrate
that, if ﬁrms maximize their market price, then free entry of ﬁrms will ensure productive eﬃciency, satisfying the unanimous preferences of shareholders.
Their demonstration is essentially equivalent to ours since in the mean-variance
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framework every shareholder holds equal proportions of every risky ﬁrm.
It is worth noting that security markets are only one means of risk sharing.
General conditions for unanimity have been presented by Wilson.9
We turn now to the formulation of our model and the derivation of our
results. Our model is highly simpliﬁed, and our results in this limited context
are at most indicative. However, in Ekern10 the results are demonstrated to
hold in a somewhat modiﬁed form when many of the simplifying assumptions
to be made below are relaxed. Also, in his note in this issue, Radner provides an
alternative (and, we believe, superior) formulation in terms of the Arrow-Debreu
model.11

2

Formulation

Our basic model is very simple.We ﬁrst state its major premises [formulae (1)
and (2) below] and then show how these can be derived from more fundamental
assumptions.
Assume that there are several individuals indexed by i ∈ I and several ﬁrms
indexed by j ∈ J. There are just two time periods, now and then, all decisions
being made now and all returns from ﬁrms occurring then, depending upon
which state k ∈ K obtains then. It will suﬃce to suppose that there is only one
commodity, which serves as money. The return of ﬁrm j in state k is a known
we
function rjk (xj ) of a decision variable xj , which for the sake of

 simplicity
assume to be diﬀerentiable. Individual i selects a portfolio si = sij in which sij
is the fraction of ﬁrm j which he owns (short sales, which are allowed, correspond
to negative sij ’s). Let pj denote the price of ﬁrm j (i.e., the price of a unit
fraction).
Our ﬁrst premise is that at a market equilibrium there exists for each individual i a set of weights ω i = (ωki ) for the states such that for each ﬁrm
j,

ωki rjk (xj ) = pj
(1)
k

For most models one derives a version of (1) as a portfolio optimality condition for each individual. The weight ωki is then individual i’s marginal rate of
substitution between present income and future income
state k. Of course
 in
sij = 1, the equality of
the equilibrium price pj is determined to ensure that
i

demand and supply, and necessarily pj ≥ 0 or the ﬁrm dissolves. It is useful to
regard the vector p = (pj ) of ﬁrms’ prices as a function p (x) = [pj (x)] of the
vector x = (xj ) of ﬁrms’ decisions.
9 In
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Our second premise is that at a market equilibrium an individual i prefers
to increase the decision variable xj of ﬁrm j if and only if


sij
ωki rjk
(xj ) > 0
(2)
k

This criterion expresses the requirement that individual i prefers an increment in
the decision variable xj if it would increase his “demand-price” for shares of the
ﬁrm, provided he is not presently a short-seller. It agrees with the market-value
criterion [i.e., pj (xj ) > 0] only under certain restrictive assumptions which are
ampliﬁed below.
For those readers who ﬁnd the above formulation of our basic model to be
unfamiliar we provide in the next paragraphs the simplest one of its several
possible derivations from more familiar premises.
Consider a model of the type employed by Irving Fisher. There is only a
single commodity, which is available now either for consumption now or for
investment by ﬁrms to yield returns for consumption then. Individual i is endowed with ei units of this commodity now, and also with a fraction sij of each
ﬁrm j. Given the ﬁrms’ investment levels x = (xj ) and prices p (x) = [pj (x)],

individual i chooses now consumption ci (x) and a portfolio si (x) = sij (x) to
maximize his expected utility




uik ci ,
sij rjk (xj ) fik
(3)
j

k

subject to the budget constraint


sij pj (x) ≤ ei +
sij pj (x)
ci +
j

(4)

j

Here, uik is individual i’s utility function for consumption now and then if
state k obtains, and fik is his assessed probability that state k will obtain.
As noted by Radner, (4) omits consideration of ﬁrms’ inputs now. Let uik
denote individual i’s marginal utility of consumption then if state k obtains.
Assuming suﬃcient mathematical regularity properties, and allowing short sales,
a necessary condition for optimality is that there exists a Lagrangian multiplier
λi = λi (x) ≥ 0 for the budget constraint such that for each ﬁrm j,

uik fik rjk (xj ) = λi pj (x)
(5)
k

Ordinarily λi > 0 and therefore if we let ωki = λ−1
i uik fik then (5) implies our
ﬁrst premise (1).
It is worth noting that if there exists a ﬁrm 0 whose return r0k (x0 ) = r0 (x0 )
 
is the same in every state, then
uik fik r0 (x0 ) = λi p0 (x) and therefore
k
 i
ωk = p0 (x) /r0 (x0 ); of course, by construction ωki ≥ 0. One can think of ωki
k
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as the price that individual i would be willing to pay now for a claim to one
unit of the commodity then in state k, which in the special case of complete
markets must be the same for every individual. It should be noted also that the
formulation of our ﬁrst premise (1) requires one to take account of the means of
ﬁnancing. If the ﬁrm purchases the commodity amount xj now for investment
by issuing shares, then (1) stands as it is, but if (say) it issues a riskless bond at
a price b = p0 /r0 (x0 ) then rjk (xj ) = Rjk (xj ) − xj /b, where Rjk (xj ) measures
the gross return before bond payments in state k (a similar formulation holds
for risky bonds).
Now consider a proposal to increment the investment level xj of ﬁrm j. Let
Ui (x) denote individual i’s maximum expected utility, given the investment
vector x; i.e., Ui (x) is (3) evaluatated at ci = ci (x) and si = si (x). One can
show directly by means of the calculus that

∂Ui (x)

|x̄ = sij (x̄)
uik fik rjk
(x̄j )
∂xj
k

provided that ei = ci (x̄) and s̄i = si (x̄); that is, provided that the system
is appraised at an equilibrium, in which all individuals are content with their
current holdings. Consequently,

−1

ωki rjk
(x̄j )
λi (x̄) ∂Ui (x̄) /∂xj = sij (x̄)
k

which implies our second premise for x = x̄.
Thus, once the economy is in equilibrium, given an investment choice x
by ﬁrms, each individual i will use (2) as the criterion by which to evaluate
proposals to change the investment levels. This criterion agrees with the marketvalue maximization criterion only if one takes the weights ωki as ﬁxed, which is
well-known to be valid only for ﬁrms which are price-takers in an economy with
complete markets, in which case the weights are themselves prices common to
every individual.
A variety of other formulations lead repeatedly to our basic premises (1)
and (2), and therefore we adopt them as the central features of our basic model.
In Section 4 we will, however, oﬀer an alternative formulation which is more
appropriate for the mean-variance framework commonly employed in the theory
of capital markets.

3

Unanimity

The claim that we made in the Introduction was that if a proposal would not
alter the state-distributions of returns available in the economy, then the ﬁrm’s
shareholders (those individuals who own positive fractions) will either unanimously approve it or unanimously disapprove it. In terms of our basic model a
project for ﬁrm j is simply an opportunity to increase (or decrease) the decision
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variable xj . [Radner provides a more rigorous formulation of a “project” as a
“feasible (local) direction of change.”12 ]
Proposition. The shareholders of a ﬁrm will approve or disapprove unanimously a project which would not alter the set of state-distributions of returns
available to individuals in the whole economy.
The argument runs as follows. For each ﬁrm j let rj (xj ) = [rjk (xj )], the
vector of state-dependent returns; thus, rj (xj ) is the state-distribution of returns available by purchasing ﬁrm j. In the whole economy each individual can
obtain any state-distribution of returns in the subspace S spanned by the set of
return vectors [rj (xj )] for all ﬁrms, subject only to his budget constraint. The
project to change the decision variable xj of ﬁrm j does not alter the feasible

set of state-distributions of returns if and only if the vector rj (xj ) = rjk
(xj )
of marginal state-dependent returns lies in S; that is,
 j
αh rh (xh )
(6)
rj (xj ) =
h∈J

for some numbers αhj , one for each ﬁrm h ∈ J. Consequently, employing ﬁrst
(6) and then (1) in the criterion (2), individual i prefers (say) to increase xj if
and only if

  j

ωki rjk
(xj ) = sij
ωki
αh rhk (xh )
0 < sij
=

sij


h∈J

= sij



h∈J

αhj



k

ωki rhk

h∈J

(xh )

k

αhj ph

(7)

Since (7) has the same sign for every shareholder, it follows that the project will
be approved or disapproved unanimously by the shareholders.
An evident special case occurs when S is in fact the whole space of statedistributions of returns, for which the usual mode of proof relies upon showing that the individuals’ weights are identical and equal to the prices of statecontingent claims.
A further illustration is provided by a generalization of Diamond’s13 model,
also analyzed recently by Leland and Ekern.14 Suppose that ﬁrm j’s returns
have the special form rjk (xj ) = gj (xj ) + hj (xj ) ljk (Diamond supposes that
gj ≡ 0) and that there exists a riskless ﬁrm 0 for which r0k (x0 ) = r0 (x0 ). Short
12 In
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sales are allowed. Then

rjk
(xj ) = gj (xj ) + hj (xj ) ljk

= aj0 r0 (x0 ) + αjj rjk (xj )
where
αjj =

hj (xj )
hj (xj )

(8a)

and
α0j =


gj (xj ) − αjj gj (xj )
r0 (x0 )

(8b)

and, therefore, the proposition implies that unanimity obtains among the shareholders.
A corollary of the criterion (7) is that, for a range of choices of the decision
variable xj by ﬁrm j which do not alter the available set of state-distributions
of returns,
choice unanimously preferred by the shareholders is the one for
 the
αhj ph = 0. (Of course the components αhj and the price ph normally
which
h∈J

depend upon x, as in Leland’s model above.) It is in this sense that the ﬁrm
is required to be a “price taker” in order to achieve productive eﬃciency. Note
that the manager of ﬁrm j actually needs only to know the components (αhj )
and the market prices (ph ) for all ﬁrms h ∈ J; no further information about
shareholders’ preferences is required, provided unanimity obtains. For example,
in the special case of Leland’s model the optimality condition takes the simple
form α0j p0 + αjj pj = 0, using the formulas (8) above for α0j and αjj , which in
his companion paper in this volume Leland interprets as “marginal cost equals
average cost” in the context of his model. As Leland observes, an important
ramiﬁcation of this result is the consequence that ﬁrms’ investment, production,
and choice-of -technique decisions are aﬀected by the market price of the ﬁrm,
and indeed, by the market prices of all ﬁrms.

4

Mean-variance model

A similar analysis is applicable when the individuals are interested only in certain parameters of their portfolios. We shall show here that unanimity obtains
whenever the shareholders value only the mean and variance of their portfolios.
Here we suppose that individuals’ probability assessments agree.
Let R (x) = [Rj (xj )] be the vector of the ﬁrms’ mean returns and let
V (x) = [Vjh (xj , xh )] be their covariance matrix. If individual i selects the
portfolio si , then his return will have mean si R (x) and variance si V (x) si .
We assume that each individual’s expected utility (3) takes the special form
ui si R (x) , si V (x) si , where we have deleted consumption now for simplicity.
Let Vj (x) be the jth row of V (x) and assume there exists a ﬁrm 0 with zero
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variance to its return. It is then easily seen that optimality of the portfolios
requires that, for each individual i and each ﬁrm j,


R0 (x0 )
(9)
pj
Rj (xj ) − 2ωi Vj (x) si =
p0
where ωi > 0 is individual i’s marginal rate of substitution between mean return
 −1 −1
is often called the “price of risk”
and variance. The quantity P = 2
ωi
because (9) implies that

Vjh (xj , xh )
Rj (xj ) − P
h∈J
pj =
(10)
R (x )
0

p0

0

A further consequence of (9) and (10) is that each individual acquires the same
fraction sij = P/ (2ωi ) of each ﬁrm j.
The portfolio optimality condition (9) corresponds to our earlier premise (1).
Corresponding to the criterion (2), there is now the criterion that individual i
prefers to increase the decision variable xj of ﬁrm j if and only if



i


i
sj Rj (xj ) − 2ωi
(11)
Vjh (xj , xh ) sh > 0
h∈J

(xj , xh ) = ∂Vjh (xj , xh ) /∂xj . N.B.: If vj (xj ) = Vjj (xj , xj ), then
where Vjh

Vjj = (1/2) vj (xj ). One obtains (11) by diﬀerentiating individual i’s maximum
expected utility partially with respect to xj , as was done in Section 2 for the
state model. Stiglitz15 notes that (11) diﬀers slightly from the criterion implied
by maximization of the market value (10) when P is taken to be ﬁxed.
We shall suppose that the submatrix of V (x) corresponding to the risky ﬁrm
is nonsingular. It then follows that there exists a solution αj to the equation

Vj (x) = αj V (x)


where Vj (x) = Vjh
(xj , xh ) is the vector of marginal covariances. Hence the
criterion (11) reduces to




0 < sij Rj (xj ) − 2ωi Vj si = sij Rj (xj ) − 2ωi αj V (x) si



R0 (x0 )
i

j
p
(12)
= sj Rj (xj ) − α R (x) −
p0
using (9). Thus, the shareholders of each ﬁrm j will be unanimous in their
response to a proposal to change the decision variable xj .
An alternative derivation of the unanimity property is provided by substituting the share formula sih = P/ (2ωi ) into (11), which shows that (11) and
15 In

[10].
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(12) can be reduced to

sij

Rj

(xj ) − P





Vjh

(xj , xh ) > 0

(13)

h∈J

Again it is evident that the manager of a ﬁrm needs only to know the market
price of risk, P , to satisfy the unanimous preferences of the ﬁrms’ shareholders.
(He must, however, avoid the temptation to replace Vjj by vj in (13), as he
would were he to seek to maximize the ﬁrm’s market value.)
Another derivation of the criterion (13) is obtained by considering the market opportunities of shareholders. For the sake of simplicity, consider a risky
ﬁrm j whose return is uncorrelated with all other ﬁrms. Let σj (xj ) be the
standard deviation of returns as a function of the decision variable xj ; i.e.,
2
σj (xj ) = vj (xj ) = Vjj (xj , xj ). An individual i will obtain from his shares
i
s0 and sij in the riskless ﬁrm and ﬁrm j a mean return of si0 R0 + sij Rj (xj )
and a standard deviation of sij σj (xj ). Consider a proposal to change the decision variable xj to xj + dxj , which would change his mean return to si0 R0 +
sij Rj (xj + dxj ) and his standard deviation to sij σj (xj + dxj ). He could obtain
the same mean and standard deviation with shares si0 −dsi0 and sij +dsij satisfying




the two equalities si0 − dsi0 R0 + sij + dsij Rj (xj ) = si0 R0 + sij Rj (xj + dxj )


and sij + dsij σj (xj ) = sij σj (xj + dxj ). Solving these equations for dsi0 /dsij
and letting dxj go to zero, one obtains
Rj (xj ) − σj (xj ) Rj (xj ) /σj (xj )
dsi0
=
R0
dsij

(14)

Now if dsi0 /dsij > pj /p0 , then individual i would prefer to reorganize his portfolio rather than to increment the decision variable xj . Hence, his criterion for
preferring to increment the decision variable xj is that
dsi0
pj
<
p0
dsij

(15)

However, employing (10) and (14), one sees that this is just the criterion
Rj (xj ) − P σj (xj ) σj (xj ) > 0

(16)

which is precisely the same as the criterion (13) in this case.
Still another derivation of the criterion (13) has been given by Wilson16 based
on the requirement that the individuals share risk eﬃciently. For example, if
each individual i has a constant Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion ri = 2ωi ,
and the ﬁrms’ returns are jointly normally distributed, then eﬃcient risk sharing
requires each ﬁrm j to act as though it has a constant measure of risk aversion
16 In

[11].
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i
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−1

= P . Thus, each ﬁrm takes the market price of risk as its

measure of risk aversion. This in turn is readily shown to imply (13).
One consequence of the preceding arguments is the conclusion that the shareholders of a ﬁrm unanimously prefer that the market price of the ﬁrm not be
maximized, which conﬂicts with one’s intuition. Jensen and Long, Fama, and
most recently Merton and Subrahmanyam17 have argued that various modiﬁcations of the notion of perfectly competitive markets are desirable to expiate
the paradox. Here, we conclude with an example which is designed to show
that the fault may lie instead with the mean-variance model itself. Consider as
before a ﬁrm j whose returns are uncorrelated with all other ﬁrms. Further,
suppose that Rj (xj ) = aj xj and σj (xj ) = bj xj ; viz., the ﬁrm’s returns have
stochastic constant-returns-to scale. Then the criterion
 (16) implies that the

eﬃcient choice of the decision variable is xj = aj / P b2j . But then according to
(10) the market price of the ﬁrm is pj = 0! The scheme advocated by Merton
and Subrahmanyam escapes this phenomenon only be supposing a sequence of
successively smaller ﬁrms, each with a smaller market price converging to zero
in the limit.

5

Summary

The substance of our results is the demonstration, admittedly for an overly simpliﬁed model, that even with incomplete markets a unanimous response from
shareholders can be expected in many cases to ﬁrms’ proposals. The simplest
models, such as Diamond’s, Leland’s, and the mean-variance model, imply unanimity in every case. The more general model asserts that unanimity will fail
to obtain only if the proposal would alter the state-distribution of returns available in the economy. In the latter case, formation of a new ﬁrm, oﬀering new
securities, provides an evident market test.
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